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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KEVIN GURR, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 940657-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(f) (1994 as Amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
First, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction 
of illegally possessing a dangerous weapon. (Issue preserved, R. 
73-83). When examining claims of insufficiency of evidence, the 
appellate court views the evidence and its reasonable inferences 
in the light most favorable to the judge's verdict. State v. 
Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985); State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah 
App. 1992), cert denied 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). Verdicts are 
reversed only where reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. Lemons, 
supra, at 381; State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). 
Second, the trial court committed error in determining that 
the Defendant was a "restricted person" as defined in Utah Code 
Annotated 76-10-503 (1989 as Amended). The issue was preserved 
at trial as demonstrated by the Defendant's post trial memorandum 
(R. 73-83). 
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The trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law. State v. Shipler, 869 P. 2d 968 (Utah App. 
1994); Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
The Utah Court of Appeals "reviews questions of law under a 
correction of error standard, without deference to the trial 
court." State v. Baqshaw, 836 P.2d 1384, 1385 (Utah App. 1992); 
State v. Shipler, supra. 
Third, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the trial 
court's determination that the Defendant was Guilty of 
possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute in 
contravention of Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) as 
identified in Count I of the Second Amended Information (R.31). 
The issue was preserved in the lower court as evidenced by the 
Defendant's post-trial memorandum (R. 74-84). 
The test for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence is 
set out in connection with the first issue identified above. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by a Second Amended Information 
with three Counts. The Defendant was charged with Possession of 
Marijuana, a Controlled Substance, with Intent to Distribute in a 
Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953 as Amended). 
The Defendant was also charged, in Count II, with Unlawful 
Possession or Use of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a 
Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 58-37a-
5(1) (1953 as Amended). 
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The Defendant was charged in Count III with Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503 (1953 as Amended) 
(R. 31-32). 
The matter was tried to the court, without a jury, who found 
the Defendant Guilty of the crimes charged but found that Counts 
I and II did not occur within a drug free zone (R. 87-91). 
STATUTES RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Statutes relevant to the disposition of the issues 
relating to possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person are as follows: 
Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503(1)(a) (1989 as Amended) 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
Any person who has been convicted of any crime of 
violence under the laws of . . . this state. . . 
may not own or have in his possession or under his 
control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-10-501(2)(c) (1989 as Amended) 
defines "dangerous weapon" as meaning, 
any item that in the manner of its use or 
intended use is capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury. The following factors shall be 
used in determining whether an item, object, or 
thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a 
dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, object, 
or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if 
any; and 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, 
object, or thing was used. 
As it relates to the meaning of "custody and control" as 
used in U.C.A. 76-10-503 (1989 as Amended), there is no statutory 
definition. The jury instruction that has been approved by the 
Utah Supreme Court relating to those terms states: 
"possession, custody or control" of a firearm 
is more than the innocent handling of the weapon. 
It requires a willing and knowing possession with 
intent to control its use or management. 
State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985). 
The person who is restricted by U.C.A. 76-10-503(1)(a) (1989 
as Amended) is "any person who has been convicted of any crime of 
violence. . . . " 
Utah Code Annotated 76-10-501(2)(a) defines "crime of 
violence" as: 
. . . aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, 
rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, 
housebreaking, extortion, or blackmail accompanied 
by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, assault. . . arson. . . or an attempt to 
commit any of these offenses. (Emphasis added.) 
There are no determinative statutes relating to the issue 
relating to possession "with intent to distribute." 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
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1. The Defendant was bound-over to the District Court on 
three counts, as delineated in the Second Amended Information 
(30-31): 
Count I: Possession of Marijuana, a Controlled 
Substance, with Intent to Distribute in a Drug Free 
Zone, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953 as Amended), 
in that the Defendant, on or about October 20, 1993, 
in Utah County, Utah, did knowingly and intentionally 
possess (sic) marijuana, a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute in a drug free zone. 
Count II: Unlawful Possession or Use of Drug 
Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
58-37a-5(l) (1953 as Amended), in that the Defendant, 
on or about October 20, 1993, in Utah County, Utah did 
knowingly and intentionally use or possess with intent 
to use, drug paraphernalia. . . . 
Count III: Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a 
Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503 (1953 as Amended), in 
that the Defendant, on or about October 20, 1993, in 
Utah County, Utah, a person convicted of a crime of 
violence had in his possession or under his custody or 
control a dangerous weapon, namely, a firearm. 
R.30-31. 
2. After a trial to the court, sitting without a jury, 
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which was held on the 26th of April, 1994, the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding authorized the filing of post-trial memoranda by the 
parties (R. 62-64). Attorneys for both the State and the 
Defendant submitted memoranda regarding their respective 
positions (R. 65-83). 
3. On June 28, 1994, Judge Harding signed a Memorandum 
Decision finding that Count I and II, relating to the possession 
of marijuana with intent to distribute and the possession of 
paraphernalia did not occur within "drug free zones" as defined 
by Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8(5) (a) (1953 as Amended) (R. 84-
85). 
4. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law signed by Judge 
Harding provided in relevant part as follows: 
1. The Defendant . . . was convicted of burglary, 
CR 86 144 in the Fourth District Court on May 2, 
1986. 
2. On October 20, 1993, the Defendant was present in 
a house/camp trailer occupies by him when officers of 
the Narcotics Task Force executed a warrant authorizing 
a search of the trailer. . . 
4. No one else resided in the trailer at the time of 
the execution of the search warrant. 
5. Personal property including possessions and 
clothing of the defendant were located in the trailer. 
6. The trailer was quite small, approximately 10 feet 
wide by 12 or 14 feet long. 
7. Officers located 8 separate baggies containing 1/8 
ounce and 1/4 ounce quantities of marijuana in the 
trailer in the general vicinity of the built-in table 
on one end of the trailer. 
8. Officers also located a set of "finger scales", 
capable of measuring small amounts or quantities. 
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9. Near the table officers located a number of larger 
sized bags containing marijuana residue. Officers 
testified that the bags were of the type typically used 
to package larger amounts of marijuana which would then 
be broken for sale into smaller quantities such as 
baggies of marijuana recovered. 
10. A Mossberg 12 gauge shotgun and a Springfield .22 
caliber rifle were located in a closet inside the 
trailer. 
11. The evidence adduced at trial indicated that the 
Defendant, while he did not own the firearms, knowingly 
had possession of the weapons. 
12. A Motorola mobile phone was found within the 
trailer. 
13. In response to questions from the officers, the 
Defendant stated that the marijuana had been "fronted" 
or provided on credit and that people called on the 
phone to inquire about marijuana. 
14. Officers located several pipes used for the 
ingestion of marijuana. 
R. 87-89. 
5. From the Findings of Fact, Judge Harding concluded that 
the Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed drug 
paraphernalia. The court concluded that the Defendant was a 
restricted person and knowingly and intentionally had firearms in 
his custody or control. Finally, the court concluded that the 
Defendant possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute 
(Addendum No. 1, R, 87). 
6. Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Judge Harding signed an Order on August 10, 1994, finding the 
Defendant Guilty on all three Counts but concluded that the 
crimes did not occur within a "drug free zone" (R. 90-91). 
7. On October 3, 1994, Judge Harding pronounced sentence and 
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the Judgment and Order of Probation was signed and entered. The 
trial court sentenced the Defendant to the Utah State Prison for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years on Counts 1 and 
III. The court sentenced the Defendant to the Utah County Jail 
on Count II for an indeterminate term not to exceed six months. 
The sentences were to run concurrently. The court suspended the 
sentence and placed the Defendant on probation for thirty-six 
months and ordered as a term thereof, that the Defendant serve 
thirty days in the Utah County Jail and pay fines and 
assessments (R. 93-94). 
8. The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 19, 1994 (R. 
97). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Deputy Shaun Adamson of the Utah County Sheriff's Office 
testified that he executed a search warrant during the night on a 
small camp trailer measuring 10f wide by 12f to 14! in length, 
located at 935 South State in Provo, Utah County (T. 124-5, 137). 
The officer was greeted by the Defendant. The officer observed a 
cellular phone on a counter and the Defendant's clothing and 
personal items throughout the small trailer (T. 127-8). 
2. In response to questions by Officer Adamson, the 
Defendant testified that the cellular phone had been a work phone 
but that he had received phone calls from persons interested in 
purchasing drugs and that the cellular phone was used because it 
was easier to get in touch with the Defendant. However, the 
Defendant did not testify to making any drug deals over the phone 
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or otherwise (T. 129-30, 133). Officer Blackhurst was the only 
Officer who testified that the Defendant admitted to making sales 
and having the marijuana fronted to him (T. 164, 216). The 
Defendant testifies that he told the officers that he had not 
used the cellular phone to arrange to purchase or sell marijuana 
and that he did not tell the officers that he had sold any 
marijuana (T. 199). 
3. Officer Adamson found several baggies of marijuana in a 
shoe box that were in eighth of an ounce packages (T. 130, 134). 
The Officer also located finger scales, used to measure envelopes 
for postage (T. 132, 134) that are sold in office supply stores 
and not capable of weighing anything like a quarter of a pound 
(T. 135). No larger scales were found (T. 170-71). The Officer 
also found firearms (T. 132). 
4. Officer Mike Blackhurst testified that he observed 
leaves of marijuana on a table by small plastic bags that the 
officer testified were the same as the zip-lock bags he had seen 
in transactions where marijuana had been sold (T.144-45) and that 
he recovered marijuana residue and cups (T. 157-58). 
5. Officer Blackhurst testified he recovered two firearms 
consisting of a rifle and shotgun in a "built-in kind of closet" 
(T. 145-46). 
6. The results from the crime lab revealed that the 
marijuana taken from the trailer consisted of 16.4 grams of 
marijuana in four plastic bags; 5.1 grams in two plastic bags of 
crushed marijuana; and, 6.3 grams of crushed marijuana in two 
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plastic bags. The total was eight bags and 27.5 grams of 
marijuana (T. 147-48). 
7. Officer Blackhurst testified that in his experience 
marijuana is packaged in eighth ounce or quarter ounce bags when 
sold. The Officer testified that he had seen marijuana packaged 
in half pound and pound bags (T. 149-50). The officer testified 
that an ounce bag of marijuana would typically cost $180.00 and 
broken down into eighth ounces and sold for $30 to $40 (T. 150-
51). The Officer testified that it would be uncommon for a 
person to buy four to six eighth ounce baggies for personal use 
(T. 152). The Officer also testified to finding five empty 
gallon bags that had marijuana residue in them that would 
represent how marijuana is bought in larger half pound quantities 
(T. 153-55). 
8. The Defendant testified that as of October 1, 1993, he 
was living with his girl friend, Joan Pew, in Springville at a 
residence other than the trailer (T. 176-77). Joan Pew Also 
testified that the Defendant had been living with her for at 
least a week prior to the Defendant's arrest (T. 211-212). The 
Defendant testified that he had lived in the trailer for two 
years prior to moving in with his girlfriend at the request of 
Mr. Tom King, the owner of T & T Mechanical, the business located 
next to the trailer, to thwart theft and vandalism (T. 177-78). 
9. The Defendant testified that the small camp trailer was 
used by Steven Page, Mr. King's foster son, who was living in the 
larger mobile home located closely to the camp trailer. The 
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Defendant testified that since the mobile home did not have water 
or power hooked up, Steven Page had a key and used the camp 
trailer to shower and use the telephone (T. 178-79). Myron 
Johnson was another individual that was using the trailer and had 
a key to it (T. 179). Other keys to the camp trailer were held 
by Tom King and Stan (T. 179). Tom King verified the Defendant's 
testimony with regard to the trailers and testified that Steve 
Page did use the camp trailer for watching TV, making phone calls 
and showering (T. 202-03). Additionally, the coffee pot in the 
trailer was used by shop workers and several persons had keys to 
the trailer (T 204). Mr. King also verified that the Defendant 
had vacated the trailer a week prior to his arrest (T. 204). 
10. After vacating the trailer the first of October, 1993, 
the Defendant testified that the trailer was used by individuals 
to make coffee, use the phone and to stay at night on occasion 
(T. 179-80). The Defendant had just quit his employment on 
October 15, 1993 and started with another company. The Defendant 
produced his income records showing that he had been gainfully 
employed during the year (T. 181-82). 
11. The Defendant testified that on the night of the search 
he had arrived at the trailer at 10:30 to 10:40 p.m. and that he 
had not been at the trailer earlier that day. The Defendant was 
in the process of checking messages when the officers knocked 
(T. 180-81). Mr. King verified that the Defendant had not been 
at the trailer earlier in the day (T. 205). 
12. The Defendant acknowledged that he had a half of an 
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ounce of marijuana at the trailer. He testified that he had 
purchased a half an ounce in four eighths (T. 183-84). The 
Defendant testified that it is unusual to buy in eights but he 
purchased the last his supplier had and it was packaged in 
eighths (T. 184). 
13. The Defendant denied selling any of the marijuana and 
denied breaking the marijuana down into smaller quantities. The 
Defendant explained that the residue was on the table because he 
had just gotten some out to smoke (T. 184-85). The Defendant 
also acknowledged that the two items of paraphernalia were his 
(T. 185). The Defendant testified that the larger bags were used 
to collect top soil and had never had marijuana in them to his 
knowledge (190-91). The smaller bags, the Defendant testified, 
were used to store sandwiches (T. 192). The $360.00 found in 
the Defendant's wallet was from his last paycheck, received 
several days before his arrest (T. 199-200). 
14. As it relates to the finger scales, the Defendant 
testified that it came with a mail chart and was last used by 
him to weigh a package he intended to mail to obtain a flashlight 
(T. 186). He testified that the scales would only measure 
approximately two or three ounces (T. 186). 
15. The Defendant testified that in purchasing marijuana 
for personal use, he had seen his supplier use heavier scales, 
called triple beams (T. 187). 
16. The Defendant testified the mobile phone was his, but 
the company owned the air time. The phone was needed 
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because his girl friend was pregnant. The phone was never used 
to purchase or sell marijuana (T. 188). 
17. The Defendant acknowledged that he was charged 
previously with burglary for going to his ex-wifefs house and 
getting in a fight with her boyfriend (T. 189). However, the 
crime was reduced to a Class A Misdemeanor (T. 189). 
18. The Defendant did not know that he could not own or 
possess a firearm after his probation was terminated (T. 189). 
The two firearms in the closet were a 12 gauge Mossberg and a 
Springfield .22 rifle (T. 190). The 12 gauge Mossberg belonged 
to Tom King and had never been used by the Defendant (T. 190). 
Mr. King verified that the shotgun was his and was kept in the 
trailer (T. 206-07). The other rifle belonged to the Defendant's 
father and had never been used by the Defendant (T. 190). The 
Defendant neither testified that he knew the guns were in the 
trailer nor that he had ever used or controlled them (T. 194). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant does not appeal or dispute the finding of the 
trial court as it relates to the possession of drug 
paraphernalia. 
As it relates to possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, the judgment is clearly deficient. The evidence is 
simply insufficient to establish that the Defendant knew the 
firearms were in the camp trailer and there is absolutely no 
evidence that the Defendant exercised control over the guns at 
any time. The evidence is clear that he did not own the guns and 
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the State failed to prove their connection to the Defendant other 
than being in a camp trailer that the Defendant had abandoned as 
his residence. 
Additionally, the Defendant was not a restricted person as 
defined by the statute. The Defendant's plea to the Burglary 
charge was amended by the trial court's granting of a 402 motion 
reducing both the category of ten crime and the sentence to a 
misdemeanor trespassing charge. Inasmuch as the Defendant is not 
a restricted person, he cannot be guilty of the crime. 
Finally, the evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction of "intent to distribute." The evidence simply 
supports possession and the finding of the trial court in that 
regard should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF POSSESSING A DANGEROUS WEAPON. 
A. The Definition of the Crime. 
The Defendant was charged in Count III with possessing a 
dangerous weapon while he was a restricted person. Utah Code 
Annotated 76-10-503(1)(a) (1989 as Amended) provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
Any person who has been convicted of any crime of 
violence under the laws of . . . this state. . . 
may not own or have in his possession or under his 
control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-10-501(2)(c) (1989 as Amended) 
defines "dangerous weapon" as meaning, 
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. any item that in the manner of its use or 
intended use is capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury. The following factors shall be 
used in determining whether an item, object, or 
thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a 
dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, object, 
or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if 
any; and 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, 
object, or thing was used. 
As it relates to the meaning of "custody and control" as 
used in U.C.A. 76-10-503 (1989 as Amended), there is no statutory 
definition. The jury instruction that has been approved by the 
Utah Supreme Court relating to those terms states: 
"possession, custody or control" of a firearm 
is more than the innocent handling of the weapon. 
It requires a willing and knowing possession with 
intent to control its use or management. 
State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1985). 
B. Test on Appeal. 
This Court in evaluating a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence, views the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the 
light most favorable to the trial court!s verdict. State v. Vigh, 
supra; State v. Booker, supra; State v. Lemons, supra. 
Verdicts are reversed only where reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
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crime of which he was convicted. State v. Vigh, supra; State v. 
Lemon, supra; State v. Johnson, supra. 
C. Summary of the Evidence in This Case. 
The evidence relating to the firearms is not complicated or 
really controverted. When the officers searched the small camp 
trailer, 
A Mossburg 12 Gauge shotgun and a Springfield .22 
caliber rifle were located in a closet inside the 
trailer. 
Finding No. 10, R. 88. 
The evidence is uncontroverted that the Defendant did not 
own the firearms. In fact, Mr. Tom King testified that he owned 
the shotgun that was stored in the camp trailer as well as other 
items of personal property located therein (T. 206-207). It was 
T & T Mechanical, of which Mr. King was a partial owner, that 
owned the camp trailer where the search warrant was executed (T. 
201-03). 
The only testimony regarding the other firearm was from the 
Defendant who testified that the gun was his father's gun (T. 
189-90). 
The Defendant testified that he did not use either gun on 
any occasion (T. 189-90). There was no testimony that the 
Defendant even knew the guns were in the trailer. 
The testimony is uncontroverted that the camp trailer, where 
the Defendant was arrested was owned by T & T Mechanical, was 
occupied by at least four different individuals plus the shop 
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personnel who went in the trailer for coffee. Two of the 
individuals went to the camp trailer to shower, watch TV and 
make telephone calls. Additionally, the Defendant had moved out 
of the trailer at least a week before the search and obviously 
had not taken the guns with him. No one testified that they saw 
the guns in the Defendant's possession or under his control. 
A case very similar to the case at bar is that of State v. 
Banks, 720 P. 2d 1380 (Utah 1986). In that case the evidence 
relating to the alleged possession of a dangerous weapon is as 
follows. The execution of a no-knock warrant revealed Banks (an 
admittedly "restricted person" as defined by statute), his wife 
and a third party as residents of the house. During the 
subsequent search, the officers saw a shotgun leaning against a 
dresser in a bedroom. A further search of the residence 
revealed three other guns: two were found under the pillow on a 
bed and a third was in a bedroom dresser drawer. Id. 
In reviewing the facts, the Utah Supreme Court agreed that 
the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for 
possessing a firearm: 
Section 76-10-503(1) of the Code prohibits any 
person who has been convicted of a crime of violence 
from owning or having a dangerous weapon "in his 
possession or under his control." Banks unquestionably 
was a restricted person to whom the Statute's 
prohibitions applied. The only question, then, is 
whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that 
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Banks possessed or controlled the .22 caliber Ruger 
found in bedroom at his residence. 
Id. 
Banks contended that although the weapon was found under a 
pillow in a bedroom, there was no evidence to indicate that the 
bedroom was occupied by Banks rather than his wife or the third 
party who also resided in the apartment. Further, there was no 
evidence that Banks owned a gun. The State argued that the 
presence of the gun in Bank's residence should be enough to 
impute its possession and control to him, even if he shared the 
residence and therefore the possession of the gun with his wife 
and third party. In response, the Court stated: 
If the evidence showed that Banks "exercised dominion 
and control" over the weapon, "with knowledge of its 
presence," we would have no difficulty holding that 
Banks could be convicted, even though he may have 
shared control of the weapon with his wife and the 
third party. See State v. Bankhead, 514 P. 2d 800, 803 
(Utah 1973); State v. Winters, 396 P.2d 872, 874 (Utah 
1964). However, there is absolutely no evidence that 
Banks knew the weapon was in the apartment or that 
he exercised any control over it. There is no logic to 
the State's suggestion that the mere presence of a gun 
in banks' house supports an inference that Banks knew 
the gun was present or that he had some control over 
it. Nor does the record suggest that either the third 
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party or Banks1 wife was a restricted person who could 
not lawfully own or possess a gun. There is no 
evidence, for example, that Banks, rather than the 
third party who admittedly lived in the house, slept in 
or otherwise used the bedroom or bed in which the gun 
was found. It would be wholly arbitrary to conclude 
that the mere presence of the gun in the 
apartment meant that Banks, rather than one of the 
other two people residing there, possessed or 
controlled it. The record here shows a simple failure 
to prove a critical element of the offense; we must 
therefore find that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the conviction and reverse. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. 
As with the Banks case, there is absolutely no testimony 
that Mr. Gurr "exercised dominion and control" over the weapons 
"with knowledge of their presence." No officer or other person 
testified that the Defendant had ever been in physical control of 
the guns or ever taken them out of the closet where they were 
stored. 
The fact that the Defendant had moved into the residence of 
his girl friend in Springville and not taken the guns is evidence 
of his lack of control over them. There is not even a 
conversation with an informant or officer in which the 
Defendant's knowledge of the guns in the trailer is established. 
The officers did not interrogate any of the other persons who had 
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access to the trailer with regard to ownership and control and in 
fact, the State did not present any evidence of ownership or 
control. 
The trial court concluded in Finding No. 11 that "the 
evidence adduced at trial indicated that the Defendant, while he 
did not own the firearms, knowingly had possession of the 
weapons." (Emphasis added.) (R. 88). 
The trial court's finding in this case is clearly against 
the weight of the evidence. State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah 
App. 1990). Additionally, deference can only be given to the 
trial court when the findings disclose "the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. Id. There 
is simply no evidence in the record that would support the trial 
court's conclusion that he knowingly had possession of the 
weapons. As mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in State v. 
Davis, supra, there must be evidence to support the conclusion 
that the firearm was more than innocently handled. There must be 
a showing that there was a willing and knowing possession with 
intent to control its use or management. 
The evidence is clearly inadequate to support the 
determination by the trial court and the judgment and verdict on 
Count III must be reversed. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DETERMINING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS A "RESTRICTED PERSON." 
A. Definition of the Crime. 
The elements of a violation of the law prohibiting a 
restricted person from possessing a dangerous weapon are set out 
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in Point I above. However, the person who is restricted by 
U.C.A. 76-10-503(1)(a) (1989 as Amended) is "any person who has 
been convicted of any crime of violence. . . . " 
Utah Code Annotated 76-10-501(2)(a) defines "crime of 
violence" as: 
. . . aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, 
rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, 
housebreaking, extortion, or blackmail accompanied 
by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, assault. . . arson. . . or an attempt to 
commit any of these offenses. (Emphasis added.) 
B. Test on Appeal. 
The trial court? s interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law. State v. Shipler, 869 P.2d 968 (Utah App. 
1994); Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
The Utah Court of Appeals "reviews questions of law under a 
correction of error standard, without deference to the trial 
court." State v. Bagshaw, 836 P. 2d 1384, 1385 (Utah App. 1992); 
State v. Shipler, supra. 
C. Evidence in This Case. 
The evidence relating to the Defendant's conviction of a 
prior criminal act encompassed the offering of State's Exhibit 
No. 1, a Minute Entry from Case No. CR-86-144, filed in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, 
dated May 2, 1986. The Minute Entry is entitled "Judgment" and 
states in pertinent part as follows: 
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The defendant [Kevin Gurr] previously entered a 
plea of Guilty to a charge of Burglary, a Third 
Degree Felony, at which time the matter was referred 
to Adult Probation and Parole. . . Mr. Petro, 
[Defendant's attorney] had a motion to sentence 
defendant under the next lower offense. . . The 
Court granted the defense motion and defendant to 
be sentenced under a Class A Misdemeanor due to the 
circumstances surrounding the charge. . . . (Emphasis 
added.) 
State's Exhibit No 1, Addendum No. 2. 
The next lower category from a Burglary is Criminal 
Trespass (U.C.A. 76-6-206 (1953 as Amended)). There is no 
question that when a motion made, pursuant to U.C.A.76-3-402 
(1953 as Amended), is granted to sentence under the next lower 
category, the conviction and sentence are deemed to be for the 
lesser charge. The statute states as follows: 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant 
was found guilty and to the history and character 
of the defendant, concludes that it would be unduly 
harsh to record the conviction as being for that 
category of offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally 
applicable to that offense, the court may, unless 
specifically provided by law, enter a judgment of 
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conviction for the next lower category of offense 
and impose sentence accordingly, . . . (Emphasis 
added.) 
The judgment of conviction in this case was for misdemeanor 
criminal trespass and accordingly, the Defendant was not 
convicted of Burglary and thereby a restricted person as defined 
by U.C.A. 76-10-501 (1989 as Amended). 
Although the Defendant went to great lengths to make this 
argument to the trial court (R. 74-76), the Findings of the Court 
are essentially silent with regard to the issue: 
1. The Defendant, Kevin W. Gurr, was convicted of 
burglary, CR 86 144 in the Fourth District Court on 
May 2, 1986. . . . 
2. the Defendant, a restricted person under U.C.A. 
Section 76-10-503, 1953 as amended, knowingly and 
intentionally had firearms in his custody and 
control. 
R. 87-89, Addendum No 1. 
In reviewing a statute, it is the duty of this Court assume 
that each term of a statute was used advisedly and that each 
should be given interpretation and application in accord with 
their usually accepted meaning. Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 485 
P.2d 1035 (Utah 1971); Board of Education of Granite School Dist. 
v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983). A statute should 
not be applied other than in accordance with its literal wording 
unless it is so unclear or inoperable. Gord v. Salt Lake City, 
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434 P. 2d 449 (Utah 1967); Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline 
Const, , 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988); Gleave v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western R. Co., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988). 
Utah Code Annotated 76-3-402 (1989 as Amended) provides that 
if the trial courts grants a 402 motion, the court will "enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense 
and impose sentence accordingly. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The 
statute does not limit the purpose for which the charge is 
lowered and does not distinguish the uses to which a 402 
reduction can be put. The statute is clear that it is not only 
the sentence that will be influenced but that the actual judgment 
of conviction is lowered to the "next category" of offense. 
It is only logical that if that reduction affords a person 
any benefit as it relates to rights and privileges, there is 
nothing in the statute that restricts itfs use. In other words, 
if a Third Degree Felony is reduced to a Class A Misdemeanor by 
means of a 402 motion, the person would no longer have the 
limitations of a felony as it affects voting, bonding or the 
like. Similarly, if a 402 motion eliminates a person from a 
category of restricted persons, the defendant should have the 
benefit of the reduction. 
In accordance with the clear meaning of the statute, the 
conviction of the Defendant was reduced from Burglary to the next 
lower category, trespass, which is not a crime of violence that 
would restrict a person's ability to own and possess a firearm. 
The judgment of conviction in this case was for misdemeanor 
24 
c r i m i n a l t r e s p a s s and a c c o r d i n g l y , t h e Defendant was not 
convicted of Burglary and thereby a r e s t r i c t e d person as defined 
by U.C.A. 76-10-501 (1989 as Amended). 
POINT III: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF POSSESSING MARIJUANA WITH THE INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE. 
A. The Definition of the Crime. 
The Defendant was charged in Count I of the Second Amended 
Information with possession of Marijuana With the Intent to 
Distribute (R. 31). 
B. Test on Appeal. 
This Court in evaluating a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence, views the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's verdict. State v. Vigh, 
supra; State v. Booker, supra; State v. Lemons, supra. 
Verdicts are reversed only where reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. State v. Vigh, supra; State v. 
Lemon, supra; State v. Johnson, supra. 
C. Summary of the Evidence in This Case. 
The evidence in the case establishes that the Defendant had 
moved from the trailer, as his residence, at least a week before 
the execution of the search warrant and his arrest. The small 
camp trailer was occupied by another individual. In addition, 
two other individuals who had been staying at the mobile home 
(that did not have any utilities) used the small camp trailer to 
watch TV, make telephone calls and take showers. there were also 
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employees of the company, including the owner that used the camp 
trailer to do books or to have a cup of coffee. The Defendant 
was simply not in exclusive possession of the camp trailer. 
As it relates to the mobile phone, the cellular phone was 
his but the air time was that of his employer. He kept the phone 
with him because his girl friend was pregnant. There was no 
evidence that the Defendant used the phone to buy drugs or to 
sell them. 
The money in the Defendant's wallet was explained by his 
cashing of his check from his job. The Defendant demonstrated 
that he had been gainfully employed during the entire year and 
had only quit his job shortly before his arrest and had already 
been hired by another company. 
Although the Defendant acknowledged that he purchased 
approximately one-half ounce of marijuana for personal use, there 
was simply no evidence of intent to distribute. The Defendant 
testified that the marijuana was packaged as it was because it 
was the last that his supplier had and it was packaged in eighth 
ounces. 
There was no evidence that the Defendant had been at the 
trailer earlier in the day of his arrest. The presence of 
sandwich bags was explained by the number of bachelor men making 
lunches and eating them in the trailer. Although the officers 
testified to larger bags, there was no evidence that the bags 
were tested for drugs and resulted in any detection of marijuana. 
The Defendant explained the presence of the finger scales. 
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He indicated that he purchased them with a mail rate guide and 
last used them to mail a package. The scales would weigh only 
two or three ounces and were incapable of weighing larger amounts 
again suggesting that the Defendant was not set up to sell 
marijuana. 
There was no testimony in this case of any informant buys 
from the defendant or an observations of buys made from the 
Defendant. 
In sum, all the State produced was the packaged marijuana, 
finger scales and plastic bags. The State did not produce 
evidence of a buy, recorded conversations, large amounts of 
marijuana, scales that could weigh large amounts or any other 
indicia of a drug dealer. Even the trial court's findings limit 
themselves to the 8 separate baggies, the finger scales and the 
presence of the larger bags as supporting the "intent to 
distribute" (R. 87-89, Addendum No. 1). 
The amount of marijuana found and the circumstances 
surrounding the arrest warrant a finding that the Defendant did 
not possess marijuana with the intent to distribute the same. 
One appropriate standard to consider in determining the severity 
of the crime of possession of marijuana is to consider the 
amount. Pursuant to U.C.A. 58-37-8(2)(b)(i-iii) (1953 as 
Amended), possession of 100 pounds of marijuana or more is a 
second degree felony; possession of 16 ounces to 100 pounds is a 
third degree felony; and, possession of less that 16 ounces is a 
class A misdemeanor. In this case, the Defendant had less than 
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28 grams which is consistent with a misdemeanor. 
In determining whether the Defendant should be charged with 
"intent to distribute," reference should be made to the relevant 
case law. The overwhelming majority of cases which dealt with 
defendants charged with possession with intent to distribute, 
included additional extrinsic evidence in addition to a small 
quantity of drugs or, an extremely large cache od drugs. State 
v. Brooks, 849 P. 2d 640 (Utah App. 1993) (officers found drugs, 
contraband, and other evidence of controlled substance 
violations); State v. Purser, 828 P. 2d 515 (Utah App. 1992) 
(officers seized 3,000 amphetamine tablets, several firearms, 
ammunition, packaging materials, large scales, drug 
paraphernalia, cash, marijuana seeds, etc.); State v. Park, 810 
P. 2d 456 (Utah App. 1991) (officers found marijuana, cash and a 
methamphetamine kit); State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 
1991) (search revealed one pound of cocaine and twenty pounds of 
marijuana); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990) 
(officers found two boxes of marijuana in fridge, cocaine and 
psilocybin mushrooms in a safe); State v. Robinson, 797 P. 2d 431 
(Utah App. 1990) (officers found eight duffel bags full of 
marijuana); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989) 
(officers found two baggies of cocaine, several bundles of 
cocaine, and defendant was charged with one count of possession 
and one count of intent to distribute). The Court in State v. 
Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985), held that in addition to the fact 
that the Defendant was growing marijuana in his residence, that 
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the key element is a Defendant's possession of an amount too 
large for personal consumption. There was nothing inconsistent 
with the amount purchased by the Defendant and the "personal 
use" 
It is respectfully submitted that the facts viewed most 
favorably from the judgment of the trial court simply does not 
support the conclusion that the Defendant possessed marijuana 
with the intent to distribute. All of the evidence is consistent 
with personal use. Accordingly, the portion of the judgment that 
found the Defendant guilty intent to distribute should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant does not appeal or dispute the finding of the 
trial court as it relates to the possession of drug 
paraphernalia. 
As it relates to possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, the judgment is clearly deficient. The evidence is 
simply insufficient to establish that the Defendant knew the 
firearms were in the camp trailer and there is absolutely no 
evidence that the Defendant exercised control over the guns at 
any time. The evidence is clear that he did not own the guns and 
the State failed to prove their connection to the Defendant other 
than being in a camp trailer that the Defendant had abandoned as 
his residence. 
Additionally, the Defendant was not a restricted person as 
defined by the statute. The Defendant's plea to the Burglary 
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charge was amended by the trial court's granting of a 402 motion 
reducing both the category of ten crime and the sentence to a 
misdemeanor trespassing charge. Inasmuch as the Defendant is not 
a restricted person, he cannot be guilty of the crime. 
Finally, the evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction of "intent to distribute." The evidence simply 
supports possession and the finding of the trial court in that 
regard should be reversed. 
Dated this day of February, 1995. 
Michael J. Petro, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
KEVIN W. GURR, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant(s). 
O R D E R 
Case No. 941400013 FS 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding presiding, on the 26th day of April, 1994. The Court has 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The 
Court has determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant 
committed the crimes of: Count I, Possession of Marijuana with 
6 
Intent to Distribute,-MCount II, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; 
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and Count III, Possession of a Weapon by a Restricted Person. 
Accordingly, a verdict of guilt to those three counts is entered. 
91 
The matter will be set for sentencing on the next available date on 
the Court's regular calendar. 
DATED this /O day of fe^-T-994. 
BY THE COURT: 
6£~^-cCu^tsi 
HARDING 
JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MICHAEL J. PETRO 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
KEVIN W. GURRf 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant(s). 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 941400013 FS 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding presiding on the 26th day of April, 1994. The Plaintiff 
was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney James R. Taylor. 
The Defendant was present in person and represented by Attorney 
Michael Petro. The court heard the evidence of the parties and has 
issued a written ruling. Being fully advised in the premises, the 
Court determines that the following have been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Defendant, Kevin W. Gurr, was convicted of burglary, 
CR 86 144 in the Fourth District Court on May 2, 1986. 
2. On October 20, 1993, the Defendant was present in a 
house/camp trailer occupied by him when officers of the Narcotics 
Task Force executed a warrant authorizing a search of the trailer. 
3. The trailer was within 1,000 feet of the grounds of a 
89 
church but not within 1,000 feet of the church itself. 
4. No one else resided in the trailer at the time of the 
execution of the search warrant, 
5. Personal property including possessions and clothing of 
the defendant were located in the trailer. 
6. The trailer was quite small, approximately 10 feet wide by 
12 or 14 feet long. 
7. Officers located 8 separate baggies containing 1/8 ounce 
and 1/4 ounce quantities of marijuana in the trailer in the general 
vicinity of the built-in table on one end of the trailer. 
8. Officers also located a set of "finger scales", capable of 
measuring small amounts or quantities. 
9. Near the table officers located a number of larger sized 
bags containing marijuana residue. Officers testified that the 
bags were of the type typically used to package larger amounts of 
marijuana which would then be broken for sale into smaller 
quantities such as the baggies of marijuana recovered. 
10. A Mossberg 12 gauge shotgun and a Springfield .22 caliber 
rifle were located in a closet inside the trailer. 
11. The evidence adduced at trial indicated that the 
Defendant, while* he did not own the firearms, knowingly had 
possession of the weapons. 
12. A motorola mobile phone was found within the trailer. 
13. In response to questions from the officers, the Defendant 
stated that the marijuana had been "fronted" or provided on credit 
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and that people had called on the phone to inquire about marijuana. 
14. Officers located several pipes used for the ingestion of 
marijuana. 
From the forgoing findings of fact the Court makes and enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Defendant was knowingly and intentionally in 
possession of drug paraphernalia including items used or intended 
for use in the storage or consumption of marijuana. 
2. The Defendant, a restricted person under U.C.A. Section 
76-10-503, 1953 as amended, knowingly and intentionally had 
firearms in his custody or control. 
3. The Defendant had possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute the marijuana. 
4. None of the activities described took place within a drug 
free zone. 
DATED this / Q day of 5s3L-1994. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MICHAEL J. PETRO 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTw 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN GURR, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER: CR-86-144 
DATE: May 2, 1986 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
Rept.: E.V. Quist, CSR 
JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court for pronouncement of 
Judgment with Kent Barry, Deputy County Attorney, appearing in 
and on behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant was present in 
Court and was represented by Attorney Michael Petro. 
The defendant previously entered a plea of Guilty to a 
charge of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony, at which time the 
matter was referred to the Adult Probation and Parole Department 
for a presentence investigation and report. The report has now 
been completed and submitted to the Court along with the recom-
mendations. 
Mr. Petro addressed the Court in defendant's behalf and 
stated the defendant concurs with the recommendation with the 
exception of the 30 day jail time. Mr. Petro made a Motion to 
sentence defendant under the next lower offense. 
The State objected to defense motion and argued same. 
The defendant addressed the Court in his own behalf. 
The Court granted the defense motion and defendant to 
be sentence under a Class A Misdemeanor due to the circumstances 
surrounding the charge. 
There being no legal reason why Judgment should not be 
pronounced at this time, it is now the Judgment of the Court that 
the defendant be confined in the Utah County Jail for a period of 
one (1) year, pay a fine of $500.00 and restitution as is 
appropriate under direction of the Probation Department. 
Execution on the jail sentence is suspended and defendant placed 
on probation under the following conditions: 
1. Defendant to enter agreement with Adult Probation 
and Parole Department and comply with terms of 
probation. 
2. That he make himself available to the Department 
and the Court when requested to do so. 
3. That he violate no laws of the United States, Utah 
or any municipality wherein he may reside. 
4. Defendant to pay a fine of $500.00 or perform 100 
hours Community Services in lieu of that fine. 
5. That he pay restitution as directed by the Pro-
bation Department. 
6. That he have no contact with the victims during his 
probation period. 
7. Defendant to serve 45 days in the Utah County Jail 
with work release as arranged with the Department. 
The defendant to report to the Utah County Jail no 
latter than 7:00 p.m. Monday, May 5th, 1986. 
The Court to retain jurisdiction in this matter as to 
change this order from time to time when so warranted. 
Dated this J/ dav of May, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)SS 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, the undersigned, Clerk of the Fourfi Dwtrtct Court 
erf Utah County, Utah, do hereby certify that the 
annexed and foregoing is a true and full copy of an 
original document on file in my office as such Clerk. 
Witness my hang^and s.eal of said Court tyi/F^*' 
CULLEN Y y^ 
C2C6&L <f (%^/^y^L^ 
TENSEN, JUDGE 
